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OPINION OF THE COURT 
____________ 
 
GREENAWAY, JR., Circuit Judge. 
 In this appeal, we must determine whether an 
arbitration clause in a signed contract covers Appellant’s 
statutory claims.  The United States District Court for the 
District of New Jersey answered this question in the 
affirmative.  We disagree.  We shall reverse and remand.  
I. BACKGROUND 
 
 In 2013, Alissa Moon (“Moon”) began performing at 
the Breathless Men’s Club (“Club”) in Rahway, New Jersey.  
In January of 2015, Moon agreed to rent performance space 
in the Club and signed an Independent Dancer Rental 
Agreement (“Contract”).  The Contract contains an 
employment provision and an arbitration clause.   
 The employment provision provides:  
Dancer understands and agrees that he/she is an 
independent contractor and not an employee of 
club.  Dancer is renting the performance space 
for an agreed upon fee previously agreed to by 
Dancer and Club. 
App. 41.   
The arbitration clause reads:  
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In a dispute between Dancer and Club under 
this Agreement, either may request to resolve 
the dispute by binding arbitration.  THIS 
MEANS THAT NEITHER PARTY SHALL 
HAVE THE RIGHT TO LITIGATE SUCH 
CLAIM IN COURT OR TO HAVE A JURY 
TRIAL – DISCOVERY AND APPEAL 
RIGHTS ARE LIMITED IN ARBITRATION. 
ARBITRATION MUST BE ON AN 
INDIVIDUAL BASIS. THIS MEANS 
NEITHER YOU NOR WE MAY JOIN OR 
CONSOLIDATE CLAIMS IN 
ARBITRATION, OR LITIGATE IN COURT 
OR ARBITRATE ANY CLAIMS AS A 
REPRESENTATIVE OR MEMBER OF A 
CLASS. 
 
 App. 42.  
 In August of 2015, Moon2 sued the Club pursuant to 
the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”), 29 U.S.C. § 201, et 
seq., the New Jersey Wage Payment Law (“NJWPL”), N.J. 
Stat. Ann. § 34:11-4.1, et seq., and the New Jersey Wage and 
Hour Law (“NJWHL”), N.J. Stat. Ann. § 34:11-56a, et seq.  
App. 10–37.  In September, the Club moved to dismiss the 
Complaint on the ground that the Contract’s arbitration clause 
foreclosed Moon from seeking relief in the District Court.  In 
November, the District Court denied the Motion to Dismiss 
and ordered the parties to engage in limited discovery on the 
arbitration issue.  After discovery, the Club filed a Motion for 
Summary Judgment in favor of arbitration and the District 
                                              
2 Another performer sued but she did not join the appeal.   
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Court held a hearing.  On July 29, 2016, the District Court 
granted the Club’s Motion for Summary Judgment 
concluding that, “[T]here [wa]s no genuine dispute as to 
whether Plaintiff’s claims fall within the scope of the 
arbitration provision.”  Moon v. Breathless, Inc., No. 
CV1506297SDWLDW, 2016 WL 4072331, at *4 (D.N.J. 
July 29, 2016).  On August 10, 2016, Moon filed a timely 
Notice of Appeal.  On appeal, Moon asks us to determine 
anew whether her claims fall within the scope of the 
Contract’s arbitration provision.   
II. JURISDICTION 
 For her federal claims, Moon invoked the District 
Court’s jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331.  For her 
state claims, Moon drew upon the District Court’s power of 
supplemental jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. § 1367.  We have 
appellate jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
 On an appeal from a grant of summary judgment, our 
review is “plenary” and we “apply the same test the district 
court should have utilized initially.”  Giles v. Kearney, 571 
F.3d 318, 322 (3d Cir. 2009) (citation omitted).  Summary 
judgment should be granted only when the record shows that 
“there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and that 
the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”  Fed. 
R. Civ. P. 56(a).  “[A]ll justifiable inferences are to be drawn 
in [the nonmovant’s] favor,” but the “mere existence of some 
evidence in support of the nonmovant is insufficient to deny a 
motion for summary judgment; enough evidence must exist to 
enable a jury to reasonably find for the nonmovant on the 
6 
 
issue.”  Giles, 571 F.3d at 322 (citing Anderson v. Liberty 
Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986)).   
IV. ANALYSIS 
 The parties debate an arbitration clause’s scope.  
Pursuant to the precedent of the Supreme Court of the United 
States, state law applies: “When deciding whether the parties 
agreed to arbitrate a certain matter (including arbitrability), 
courts generally . . . should apply ordinary state-law 
principles that govern the formation of contracts.”  First 
Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 944 
(1995).   
 The parties agree that New Jersey law applies to this 
controversy.  See Appellant’s Br. at 8 (“As a matter of 
contract interpretation, federal courts apply state contract law 
to determine the scope of an arbitration clause.”); Appellee’s 
Br. at 4 (“Federal courts ordinarily apply state contract law in 
determining the enforceability and scope of an arbitration 
clause.”). 
 Thus we must decide two questions under New Jersey 
law:  First, should a court decide whether the parties should 
submit this issue to arbitration?  Second, if the parties have 
contracted to allow a court to decide arbitrability, have the 
parties agreed to arbitrate the claims at issue here?  We 
answer the first question in the affirmative and the second 
question in the negative.  
A. A Court Should Decide Arbitrability   
 Under New Jersey law, “the law presumes that a court, 
not an arbitrator, decides any issue concerning arbitrability.”  
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Morgan v. Sanford Brown Inst., 137 A.3d 1168, 1177 (N.J. 
2016).  To overcome this presumption, an arbitration clause 
must contain “‘clea[r] and unmistakabl[e]’ evidence ‘that the 
parties agreed to arbitrate arbitrability.’”  Id. (alterations in 
original) (quoting First Options, 514 U.S. at 944).  “Silence 
or ambiguity in an agreement does not overcome the 
presumption that a court decides arbitrability.”  Id. at 1178.   
 The Supreme Court of New Jersey applied these 
principles in Morgan v. Sanford Brown Institute.  In that case, 
students sued a for-profit, post-secondary education institute 
under the New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act; and the institute 
moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the 
students signed the following arbitration agreement with the 
institute: “[A]ny objection to arbitrability or the existence, 
scope, validity, construction, or enforceability of this 
Arbitration Agreement shall be resolved pursuant to this 
paragraph (the ‘Arbitration Agreement’).”  Id. at 1182. 
 In Morgan, the court found that the arbitration clause 
did not strip the court of its authority to decide arbitrability.  
It supported its conclusion with two arguments.  First, “[t]he 
paragraph does not explain that an arbitrator will decide 
whether the parties agreed to arbitrate legal claims, including 
statutory violations . . . .”  Id. at 1179.  Second, the institute 
conceded the issue in the lower court: “Defendants did not 
argue to the motion court that it lacked jurisdiction to decide 
whether the parties agreed to arbitration because that role was 
for the arbitrator alone.”  Id. 
 For the same reasons, we find that the parties here did 
not agree to arbitrate arbitrability.  First, the arbitration clause 
here falls below the standard set by Morgan.  In Morgan, the 
arbitration clause referenced arbitrability but did not clearly 
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delegate this issue to an arbitrator:  “[A]ny objection to 
arbitrability or the existence, scope, validity, construction, or 
enforceability of this Arbitration Agreement shall be resolved 
pursuant to this paragraph (the ‘Arbitration Agreement’).”  Id. 
at 1182.  Here, the arbitration clause fails to mention 
arbitrability, let alone the venue for deciding it:  
In a dispute between Dancer and Club under 
this Agreement, either may request to resolve 
the dispute by binding arbitration.  THIS 
MEANS THAT NEITHER PARTY SHALL 
HAVE THE RIGHT TO LITIGATE SUCH 
CLAIM IN COURT OR TO HAVE A JURY 
TRIAL – DISCOVERY AND APPEAL 
RIGHTS ARE LIMITED IN ARBITRATION. 
ARBITRATION MUST BE ON AN 
INDIVIDUAL BASIS. THIS MEANS 
NEITHER YOU NOR WE MAY JOIN OR 
CONSOLIDATE CLAIMS IN 
ARBITRATION, OR LITIGATE IN COURT 
OR ARBITRATE ANY CLAIMS AS A 
REPRESENTATIVE OR MEMBER OF A 
CLASS. 
 
 App. 42.  
 
 Second, like in Morgan, the Defendant conceded in the 
trial court that courts must decide issues of arbitrability:  
When confronted with a motion to stay or 
dismiss under the [Federal Arbitration Act], the 
Court engages in a limited review to determine 
whether: (1) there is a valid, enforceable 
agreement to arbitrate; (2) the claims at issue 
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fall within the scope of the agreement to 
arbitrate; and, (3) the moving party has waived 
arbitration. 9 U.S.C. § 3 . . . . 
Motion to Dismiss in Favor of Arbitration or, in the 
Alternative, to Stay Pending Arbitration at 6, Alissa Moon et 
al. v. Breathless, Inc., No. 2:15-cv-06297-SDW-LDW (D.N.J. 
Sept. 24, 2015), ECF No. 12-2 (emphasis added).  Having 
established our power to decide the arbitration clause’s scope, 
we now turn to this issue.  
B. A Court Should Decide Moon’s Wage-and-Hour 
Claims 
 To cover a statutory right under New Jersey law, an 
arbitration clause must do three things.  First, it must identify 
the general substantive area that the arbitration clause covers: 
“To pass muster, however, a waiver-of-rights provision 
should at least provide that the employee agrees to arbitrate 
all statutory claims arising out of the employment relationship 
or its termination.”  Garfinkel v. Morristown Obstetrics & 
Gynecology Assocs., 773 A.2d 665, 672 (N.J. 2001); see also 
Atalese v. U.S. Legal Servs. Grp., 99 A.3d 306, 315–16 (N.J. 
2014) (“But the clause, at least in some general and 
sufficiently broad way, must explain that the plaintiff is 
giving up her right to bring her claims in court or have a jury 
resolve the dispute.”); Martindale v. Sandvik, Inc., 800 A.2d 
872, 883 (N.J. 2002) (“In the circumstances of this case, the 
language in the arbitration agreement not only was clear and 
unambiguous, it was also sufficiently broad to encompass 
reasonably plaintiff’s statutory causes of action.”).  
 Second, it must reference the types of claims waived 
by the provision: “It should also reflect the employee’s 
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general understanding of the type of claims included in the 
waiver, e.g., workplace discrimination claims.”  Garfinkel, 
773 A.2d at 672.  It need not, however, mention the specific 
statutory rights at issue:  “We do not suggest that the 
arbitration clause has to identify the specific constitutional or 
statutory right guaranteeing a citizen access to the courts that 
is waived by agreeing to arbitration.”  Atalese, 99 A.3d at 
315. 
 Third, it must explain the difference between 
arbitration and litigation: “The waiver-of-rights language, 
however, must be clear and unambiguous—that is, the parties 
must know that there is a distinction between resolving a 
dispute in arbitration and in a judicial forum.”  Id. at 315; see 
also Martindale, 800 A.2d at 884 (enforcing an arbitration 
clause because it, inter alia, “addressed specifically a waiver 
of the right to a jury trial, augmenting the notice to all parties 
to the agreement that claims involving jury trials would be 
resolved instead through arbitration”).   
 The Supreme Court of New Jersey has interpreted 
three arbitration clauses to determine whether they covered a 
particular type of statutory claim.  In two of these cases, 
Garfinkel and Atalese, the court found that the arbitration 
clause did not cover the plaintiff’s statutory claims.  In the 
other, Martindale, the Supreme Court of New Jersey came to 
the opposite conclusion.  The case at bar resembles Garfinkel 
and Atalese more than Martindale.  As a result, we conclude 
here that the arbitration clause does not cover Moon’s wage-
and-hour claims.  
1. Garfinkel 
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 In Garfinkel, a doctor employed by the Morristown 
Obstetrics and Gynecology Associates (“MOGA”) sued 
MOGA for breaching an employment contract, for 
perpetrating a tort, and for violating the New Jersey Law 
Against Discrimination (“LAD”).  Garfinkel, 773 A.2d at 
668.  In response to the doctor’s suit, MOGA invoked the 
following arbitration clause: 
Except as otherwise expressly set forth in 
Paragraphs 14 or 15 hereof, any controversy or 
claim arising out of, or relating to, this 
Agreement or the breach thereof, shall be 
settled by arbitration in Morristown, New 
Jersey, in accordance with the rules then 
obtaining of the American Arbitration 
Association, and judgement [sic] upon any 
reward rendered by the arbitrator or arbitrators 
may be entered in any court having jurisdiction 
thereof. 
Id. 
 The Supreme Court of New Jersey found that the 
arbitration clause did not cover the doctor’s statutory claims 
for three reasons.  First, the clause did not reference statutory 
claims: “Moreover, the language does not mention, either 
expressly or by general reference, statutory claims redressable 
by the LAD.”  Id at 672.  Second, the clause implicitly 
exempted all other statutory claims by explicitly exempting 
some:  “As noted, paragraph eighteen excepts from its 
purview the two paragraphs of the agreement pertaining to 
post-termination restrictions and severance pay.  Those 
exceptions further suggest that the parties intended disputes 
over the terms and conditions of the contract, not statutory 
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claims, to be the subject of arbitration.”  Id.  Third, the clause 
mentioned contract disputes:  “The clause states that ‘any 
controversy or claim’ that arises from the agreement or its 
breach shall be settled by arbitration.  That language suggests 
that the parties intended to arbitrate only those disputes 
involving a contract term, a condition of employment, or 
some other element of the contract itself.”  Id. 
2. Atalese 
 In Atalese, a customer sued a debt-adjustment services 
company in New Jersey court for violating New Jersey’s 
Consumer Fraud Act and the Truth-in-Consumer Contract, 
Warranty and Notice Act.  The company responded by 
invoking the following arbitration clause of its service 
agreement:  
In the event of any claim or dispute between 
Client and the USLSG related to this 
Agreement or related to any performance of any 
services related to this Agreement, the claim or 
dispute shall be submitted to binding arbitration 
upon the request of either party upon the service 
of that request on the other party. 
Atalese, 99 A.3d at 310. 
 The Supreme Court of New Jersey found that the 
consumer had not waived her statutory rights by signing this 
arbitration provision because “the wording of the service 
agreement did not clearly and unambiguously signal to 
plaintiff that she was surrendering her right to pursue her 
statutory claims in court.”  Id. at 316.  
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3. Martindale 
 In Martindale, an employee sued her employer under 
New Jersey’s Family Leave Act and New Jersey’s Law 
Against Discrimination.  In response to suit, her employer 
invoked an arbitration clause contained in an employment 
application.  The clause read as follows: “As a condition of 
my employment, I agree to waive my right to a jury trial in 
any action or proceeding related to my employment with [the 
Employer].  I understand that I am waiving my right to a jury 
trial voluntarily and knowingly, and free from duress or 
coercion.”  Martindale, 800 A.2d at 875 (capitalization 
omitted).   
 The Supreme Court of New Jersey found that the 
arbitration clause covered the employee’s claims for two 
reasons.  First, the court found that the contract was 
sufficiently broad because, unlike in Garfinkel and other 
cases, it did not make a limiting reference to a contract: 
“Unlike the arbitration provisions contained in Garfinkel and 
Alamo, the arbitration provision here does not contain any 
limiting references.”  Id. at 884.  Second, the court held that 
the arbitration provision was appropriately clear because it 
specifically referenced the type of claims covered: “Its 
wording provided plaintiff with sufficient notice at the time 
she signed the agreement that all claims relating to 
employment with and termination from [the Employer] would 
be resolved through arbitration.”  Id. 
4. Applying Garfinkel, Atalese, and Martindale 
 Garfinkel and Atalese govern the case at bar.  We 
reach this conclusion because the arbitration clause at issue 
here, like the arbitration clauses in Garfinkel and Atalese, 
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references contract disputes–not statutory rights.  In 
Garfinkel, the clause applied to “any controversy or claim 
arising out of, or relating to, this Agreement or the breach 
thereof . . . .”  Garfinkel, 773 A.2d at 668.  In Atalese, the 
clause covered “any claim or dispute . . . related to this 
Agreement or related to any performance of any services 
related to this Agreement . . . .”  Atalese, 99 A.3d at 310.  
Here, the clause likewise only includes “a dispute between 
Dancer and Club under this Agreement.”  App. 42.  The Club 
has not identified a significant difference between these three 
formulations which all point to disputes related to the 
agreement at issue.   
 In Atalese and Garfinkel, the Supreme Court of New 
Jersey found that the quoted language made the arbitration 
clauses applicable only to contract claims.  Atalese, 99 A.3d 
at 315 (“Nor is it written in plain language that would be clear 
and understandable to the average consumer that she is 
waiving statutory rights.”); Garfinkel, 773 A.2d at 672 (“That 
language suggests that the parties intended to arbitrate only 
those disputes involving a contract term, a condition of 
employment, or some other element of the contract itself.”).  
Because the arbitration clause here resembles the arbitration 
clauses in Garfinkel and Atalese, and because the Supreme 
Court of New Jersey found that the arbitration clauses in 
Garfinkel and Atalese only applied to contract disputes, we 
hold that the arbitration clause here does not cover Moon’s 
statutory claims.   
 Two issues prevent us from finding that Martindale 
governs the case at bar.  First, Martindale held that the 
contract was sufficiently broad to cover statutory claims 
because it lacked a limiting principle, such as a reference to 
an agreement, unlike Garfinkel. Martindale, 800 A.2d at 884.  
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Here, the contract contains a limiting term because it directly 
references the Contract: “In a dispute between Dancer and 
Club under this Agreement . . . .”  App. 42.  Second, 
Martindale held that the arbitration clause was sufficiently 
clear to cover statutory rights because it specifically 
referenced claims “related to my employment with [the 
Employer].”  Martindale, 800 A.2d at 875.  Here, the 
arbitration clause does not reference employment or status as 
an independent contractor.     
 In its decision, the District Court focused on Moon’s 
attempts to question the arbitration clause’s validity.  It 
devoted the final two pages of its decision to the issue 
presented here.  In those final pages, the District Court cited 
Atalese in passing but it did not cite Morgan, Garfinkel, 
Martindale, and the principles that those cases support.  
Insofar as those decisions control, the District Court erred in 
omitting any reference to them.     
 On appeal, the Club responds to Garfinkel in two 
ways.3  First, it disputes the factual similarities and argues 
that Garfinkel does not govern the case before us because 
Garfinkel involved employees, whereas the case at bar 
involves, according to the Club, an independent contractor:  
“None of the cases cited by Appellant involved a dispute as to 
whether the individual making statutory employment claims 
was an employee or independent contractor.”  Appellee’s Br. 
at 12.  Second, it asserts that deciding the arbitration question 
would force the court to determine the case’s merits and that 
the Supreme Court has prohibited this result:  “If the Court 
were to find that Breathless should have specifically 
                                              
3 The Club ignores Atalese’s substance entirely. 
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referenced an employment relationship or statutory 
employment claims in the arbitration provision, which it 
should not, the Court would effectively be ruling on the 
merits of Appellant’s underlying claims . . . .”  Id. at 13.  
 Neither argument persuades.  The first argument lacks 
merit because the Supreme Court of New Jersey has applied 
Garfinkel to cases outside of the employment context.  See, 
e.g., Atalese, 99 A.3d at 314 (applying Garfinkel to a 
consumer contract).   
 The second argument also misses the mark because the 
case that it relies upon does not support its point.  To 
substantiate this second argument, the Club quotes the 
following language from AT&T Technologies, Inc. v. 
Communications Workers of America:  “[I]n deciding 
whether the parties have agreed to submit a particular 
grievance to arbitration, a court is not to rule on the potential 
merits of the underlying claims.”  475 U.S. 643, 649 (1986).  
This language establishes the two step process for deciding 
arbitration disputes and the requirement that courts may only 
resolve issues that fall outside of the arbitration clause.  See 
id. at 651 (“If the court determines that the agreement so 
provides, then it is for the arbitrator to determine the relative 
merits of the parties’ substantive interpretations of the 
agreement.”).  It does not, as the Club asserts, prove the 
impossibility of distinguishing these two steps.  Indeed, in 
AT&T Technologies, Inc., the Supreme Court remanded the 
case to the trial court to perform the first step of the inquiry.  
Id. at 648. 
 Furthermore, the Club’s second argument fails because 
the District Court could find that the arbitration clause does 
not cover the plaintiff’s wage-and-hour claims without 
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deciding the claims’ merits.  To answer the arbitrability 
question, the Court must decide what the arbitration provision 
says.  See Hirsch v. Amper Fin. Servs., LLC, 71 A.3d 849, 
857 (N.J. 2013) (“A court must look to the language of the 
arbitration clause to establish its boundaries.”).  To resolve 
the separate wage-and-hour claims, the Court would need to 
determine what the Appellant does.  See Rutherford Food 
Corp. v. McComb, 331 U.S. 722, 729 (1947) (“Where the 
work done, in its essence, follows the usual path of an 
employee, putting on an ‘independent contractor’ label does 
not take the worker from the protection of the Act.”). 
 The Club presents one final counterargument—that 
Moon’s claim that she should be treated as an employee 
actually arises “under the Agreement” because it refers to 
Moon as an “independent contractor.”  Appellant’s Br. at 10–
11 (citing App. 41, 42).  Despite the contract’s employment 
provision, Moon’s claims still arise under the FLSA and New 
Jersey statutes, not the agreement itself.  In Bell v. 
Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority, we held 
that SEPTA employees’ wage-related claims under the FLSA 
did not arise under their Collective Bargaining Agreement 
(“CBA”) merely because they asked for more pay than agreed 
upon in the CBA.  733 F.3d 490, 495–96 (3d Cir. 2013).  The 
employees did not argue that SEPTA failed to compensate 
them in the amount set forth in the CBA; they instead argued 
that the CBA in question failed to comply with the FLSA.  Id. 
at 495.  As such, resolution of the FLSA claims required 
resolution not of a dispute under the terms of the CBA, but of 
a statutory claim that the CBA violated the law.  Id.  Thus, we 
held the arbitration clause governing disputes under the CBA 
in that case did not apply to their FLSA claims.  Id. at 496.  
Similarly, Moon’s claim here is that she should receive 
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certain wages and benefits as an employee under the FLSA 
despite her agreement stating otherwise.  Because she relies 
“solely on [her] statutory, rather than [her] contractual, rights 
to recovery, . . . [she] may proceed on [her] FLSA claims 
without first seeking arbitration.”  Id.  
 Because the arbitration clause at bar resembles those at 
issue in Garfinkel and Atalese more than the one at issue in 
Martindale and because Moon’s claims arise under statutes 
rather than the Contract, we find that the arbitration clause 
does not cover Moon’s statutory wage-and-hour claims. 
V. CONCLUSION  
 For the foregoing reasons, we will reverse the orders 
of the District Court and remand these matters.  
